And a few updated thoughts about the arbitration in light of the CBA. (Re-link to my cba post on ES from last week:
http://www.extremeskins.com/showthr...ncapped-year&p=8899538&viewfull=1#post8899538; these thoughts also expressed later in that thread.)
1) Though we filed under Article 15, as I thought wise, it appears we didn't try to go the sneaky route I was suggesting under Article 15 to shift the fairly heavy burden of proof (clear preponderance of the evidence) away from us (i.e., we didn't submit a contract to the league that would have put us over our "downward adjusted" cap, get that contract disapproved by the NFL, and then contest that disapproval before the System Arbitrator.) My argument might not have flown, and we may well not need to shift the burden of proof in order to win, but I would have liked for us to give it a shot.
2) As to timing, everyone is saying it's completely up in the air. In fact, Article 15, Section 5 provides for an "expedited" proceeding, and that the proceeding may be "commenced" with 3 days' written notice (not clear what "commenced" entails): "Procedures: All matters in enforcement proceedings before the System Arbitrator shall be heard and determined in an expedited manner. An enforcement proceeding may be commenced upon 72 hours written notice (or upon shorter notice if ordered by the System Arbitrator) served upon the party against whom the enforcement proceeding is brought and filed with the System Arbitrator."
3) It's unclear the extent to which our claim focuses on a) the substance of the "adjusted" cap, i.e., the arbitrariness/wrongfulness of taking away cap space in the absence of any conduct running afoul of any CBA, and/or b) the improper process (under the NFL Constitution and Bylaws) by which some sub-set of the Competition Committee decided upon this adjustment, without the input or ratification of the owners as a whole, or, apparently, of the full membership of the Committee (at least not including Jones).
4) A subtle but novel and potentially important point. As to the substance claim, no one else seems to be pointing to the fact that the new CBA (in a very difficult to parse provision, Article 11, Section 5(b)(i)) would seem to allow us to have wiped clean our entire future cap hit in 2010 by cutting players such as Haynesworth prior to the 2011 league year starting on March 11, 2011. Thus, it's extremely hard to see how "competitive balance" is thrown out of whack by our wiping clean our future cap hit in 2010 by renegotiating the contracts (rather than terminating them), because the only difference is that we had Haynesworth (nominally) on the team between March and July, 2011.
Same idea, stated a bit differently: Given that the new CBA expressly permits teams to have wiped clean cap hits looming for 2011 and beyond by accelerating them into the uncapped "loophole" of the 2010 league year by cutting a player, it's extremely hard to see how competitive balance is fundamentally undermined when teams evade the "spirit" of some unidentified CBA by wiping clean looming cap hits in the loophole year of 2010 through renegotiating a player's contract to accelerate the cap hit into 2010.
This goes to the argument surfaced (but not endorsed) by PCinOz: that what's different about what the Skins and Cowboys did is to wipe clean cap hits already on the books, whereas what other teams did was to act in 2010 to do whatever they wanted in 2010 to help them in the future--the first throwing off competitive balance (by allowing a get out of (cap) jail free card for already existing contracts and corresponding cap obligations incurred under the prior CBA), the second not altering competitive balance in any sanctionable way (because the conduct occurred when no laws (and no collusion) was in place). First, that distinction is entirely arbitrary as to what does or does not violate competitive balance, as many have pointed out. My point here, though, is that the new CBA expressly allows a get out of (cap) jail free card for 2010 behavior that wipes clean cap hits looming into the future for already existing contracts (and corresponding cap obligations) incurred under the prior CBA.