- Joined
- Nov 17, 2010
- Messages
- 5,705
- Reaction score
- 106
- Points
- 143
- Alma Mater
Ok there are some myths that need dispelling, I see several normally intelligent posters saying things like " well we just need to give it a year because it takes time to get the players to be effective in a 34." or " everyone knew this was gonna take time to rebuild this defence" or worse yet " this team has no talent on defence."
some truths
1- This defence has several talented players, we just dont use them correctly.
2- No Hybrid 3-4 was ever as succsesful as a team that went full on 3-4 HOWEVER, No team ever made the switch as poorly timed as the Redskins.
3-despite what some stupid people may have told you, the 3-4 requires a completely skillset from almost every player in the front 7. and contrary to popular belief, its not all physical.
4- being big strong and fast doesnt guarentee successful switching.
I found this post by a Packers fan who was looking for stuff about the change to a 3-4 when his team was doing it last year, there are some very interesting facts in his post.
Credited to Waldo
"So.....an unbiased review of all the teams that I could come up with that have switched from pure 4-3 to either a hybrid or 3-4 base in the last 10 years. I compare their season prior to the switch to the season they made the switch, in an effort to study many of the truths, half truths, and myths about converting from one defense or the other. The raw data used is the performance stats of the defense. The first post goes team by team to examine each situation and look at the stats. The second post is a roll up analysis comparing all situations to each other, looking at the change, positive or negative, from one year to another. My thinking has been greatly altered by undertaking this exercise, I learned many things that I did not expect to discover.
Raw Data and Commentary of the individual situations:
There were 10 teams running 3-4 or hybrid defenses in the 2008 season. How they changed:
(Pittsburgh is excluded as they have been running the defense for decades, making data difficult to find, and it was done prior to the current era of free agency):
Abbreviations used: PPG = Points per game (scoring defense), YPC = Yards per carry (run defense), YPP = Yards per pass (pass defense), PRA = Passer rating against (Pass defense), 3D = 3rd down % (sub package defense), Sk = Sacks, Int = Interceptions, Pen = Penalties
(fumbles were ignored due to random nature of recoveries)
San Fransisco 49ers:
The 49ers began the change to a 3-4 defense in 2005 when Mike Nolan took over, primarily a 2 gap 3-4 base. The defense never really took and yearly the team would waiver between a 3-4, 4-3, and Big Nickel as the base defense, until Singletary took over full time in 2008 and fully committed to a 1 gap 3-4 front.
2004 performance (2-14): 28.2 PPG (32nd), 4.0 YPC (12th), 7.5 YPP (25th), 96.5 PRA (29th), 40% 3D (23rd), 29 sk (29th), 9 int (29th), 107 pen (10th)
2005 performance (4-12): 26.8 PPG (29th), 3.8 YPC (11th), 8.0 YPP (32nd), 94.2 PRA (29th), 38% 3D (18th), 28 sk (28th), 16 int (14th), 120 pen (20th)
San Francisco's defense showed slight improvement overall despite a very poor offensive showing. The biggest improvement came in turnovers, where the defense noticeably improved. There were slight improvements to the overall scoring defense, run defense, and 3rd down defense, however the defense yielded a lot of big plays and was penalized more. There was no improvement to the pressure applied by the defense.
San Diego Chargers:
Martyball came to San Diego in 2002. After two dreadful years running a 4-3 defense, he fired his DC and hired the head honcho of the 1 gap 3-4 in the NFL, Wade Phillips, to transition the defense to a 3-4. Unlike the situation in San Francisco, the team already had a young NT entering his prime that toiled in obscurity in the 4-3 alignment, and heavy draft resources were dedicated to the effort.
2003 Performance (4-12): 26.7 PPG (31st), 4.3 YPC (20th), 6.8 YPP (18th), 94.3 PRA (32nd), 42% 3D (29th), 30 sk (24th), 13 int (23rd), 110 pen (21st)
2004 Performance (12-4): 19.6 PPG (11th), 3.7 YPC (6th), 6.9 YPP (14th), 76.6 PRA (9th), 35% 3D (10th), 29 sk (29th), 23 int (3rd), 109 pen (12th)
The returns from the switch in San Diego was immediate drastic improvement, improving from one of the leagues worst squads to a solidly above average squad. The most notable areas of improvement were huge improvements to the run defense, interceptions, and 3rd down efficiency. The one area that notably did not improve was the defenses ability to apply pressure, however their star pass rusher was not added until the following season.
Dallas Cowboys:
The Big Tuna was brought to Dallas in 2003 by Jerry Jones to turn the sinking franchise around. Unlike the previous two examples, Parcells slow played the transition and didn't make the switch until he had acquired many of the pieces. The year the switch was made (2005), heavy resources were dedicated to the effort, including a FA NT, 2 DE's via the draft and 2 OLB's via the draft. Bill Parcells is the standard bearer in the NFL of the old style Fairbanks 2 gap 3-4 prevalent in the NFL in the 1980's.
2004 Performance (6-10): 25.3 PPG (27th), 4.2 YPC (17th), 7.4 YPP (23rd), 94.2 PRA (27th), 39% 3D (22nd), 33 sk (26th), 13 int (24th), 104 pen (7th)
2005 Performance (9-7): 19.2 PPG (12th), 4.2 YPC (22nd), 6.7 YPP (13th), 75.1 PRA (9th), 35% 3d (6th), 37 sk (14th), 15 int (19th), 142 pen (32nd)
The Cowboys defense overall saw marked improvement after making the switch, moving from an overall poor unit to an above average unit the first year. Unlike SD and SF, the biggest gains were to the pass defense, where the unit improved across the board, with a very good showing on 3rd downs. The run defense changed little in the first year. The squad did see an increase in pressure, somewhat bucking the trend. One thing that stands out is that the unit was heavily penalized in the first year.
Miami Dolphins:
I'm actually going to consider a 3 year period for the Dolphins, due in part to the relevance to the Packers of today. Prior to 2005, the Dolphins had been running a Jim Bates 4-3, which he brought to Green Bay and installed after the hiring of Nick Saban. When Saban was hired, he began to transition the defense towards a 3-4 defense, and for a few years the team ran a complex 4-3/3-4 hybrid, at first primarily coached by Saban, but after the firing of Dom Capers from Houston he was brought on board to coordinate the defense full time in 2006.
2004 Performance (9-7): 22.1 PPG (20th), 4.3 YPC (18th), 6.5 YPP (5th), 76.9 PRA (10th), 32% 3D (5th), 36 sk (21st), 15 int (19th), 107 pen (10th)
2005 Performance (9-7): 19.8 PPG (15th), 3.7 YPC (7th), 6.7 YPP (13th), 82.4 PRA (22nd), 40% 3D (23rd), 49 sk (2nd), 14 int (23rd), 105 pen (7th)
2006 Performance (6-10): 17.7 PPG (5th), 3.5 YPC (3rd), 6.6 YPP (9th), 84.4 PRA (21st), 38% 3D (17th), 47 sk (3rd), 8 int (31st), 91 pen (13th)
Over the course of the hybrid period, the defense improved from a below average unit to an elite unit over the course of two seasons, being an average unit in the first hybrid year. During this period the run defense continually improved, whereas the pass defense slightly declined. Notable, the 3rd down performance drastically declined after Bates' departure, and the interception totals slumped, however the pressure drastically improved. There were no effects on the penalties called against the team.
New York Jets:
The New York Jets is one example of a 4-3 to 3-4 switch done while doing little to alter the personnel immediately, especially odd considering the previous defense, a 4-3 Tampa-2 incarnation led by Herm Edwards, had personnel fairly poorly suited to running a 3-4. But that didn't stop Eric Mangini from making the change, opting to quickly make the switch in lieu of slow playing it or a hybrid period. Mangini's version is straight from the Parcells/Bellicheck tree and is a modern incarnation of an old style Fairbanks 2 gap 3-4.
2005 Performance (4-12): 22.2 PPG (23rd), 3.9 YPC (12th), 6.5 YPP (7th), 73.1 PRA (6th), 42% 3D (28th), 30 sk (25th), 21 int (5th), 115 pen (16th)
2006 Performance (10-6): 18.4 PPG (6th), 4.6 YPC (26th), 6.5 YPP (6th), 78.0 PRA (12th), 36% 3D (10th), 35 sk (15th), 16 int (17th), 105 pen (29th)
Though the defense struggled with run defense in the first year, slumping from an above average unit to a bottom dweller, overall the defense improved from a well below average unit to a borderline elite unit in the first season. The really notable area of improvement is the 3rd down performance of the squad, which drastically improved. The pass defense declined a little, especially in the turnovers, but he was able to create more pressure in the first year in the defense. The defense however was highly penalized, slumping from an average unit to a bottom dweller. There are similarities in how this switch went and how the switch went in Dallas, notable due to the similarities of the scheme (fairly dissimilar from Dom's concepts).
New England Patriots:
Bill Belichick was hired in 2000 to return the Pats to glory. He followed the Parcells model to transition to the 3-4, acquiring the pieces over a few years (and playing the occasional 3-4 look) before fully making the switch in 2003 (though they waiver between 3-4 looks and 4-3 looks even today). The year of the switch they dedicated draft resources to the change, and acquired several pieces in FA, including experienced NT Ted Washington. Notably they won the super bowl the year they made the switch.
2002 Performance (9-7): 21.6 PPG (17th), 4.7 YPC (29th), 6.4 YPP (8th), 78.2 PRA (15th), 43% 3D (26th), 34 sk (20th), 18 int (12th), 99 pen (7th)
2003 Performance (14-2*): 14.9 PPG (1st), 3.6 YPC (6th), 5.6 YPP (1st), 56.2 PRA (1st), 34% 3D (7th), 41 sk (6th), 29 int (1st), 107 pen (19th)
This was another soft change, time was taken to build the pieces, and the team had occasionally run 3-4 concepts even predating Bill, but they changed to a 3-4 base in 2003 in a dramatic fashion. The unit shot from average to elite overnight, placing first in many categories. It has the hallmarks of the Fairbanks 2 gap 3-4 switch however, drastic improvement in 3rd down performance, increased pressure, and an increase in flags. However unlike Mangini and Parcells, Belichick's change was accompanied by drastic run defense improvement, which propelled the unit to the very top and won a Lombardi trophy.
Cleveland Browns:
When Romeo Crennel was hired in Cleveland off of New England's staff, the first thing he set out to do was sweep away Butch Davis' 4-3 defense and install his own brand of a Fairbanks 2 gap 3-4. Again like Mangini in NY, little effort was paid to actually acquire new players prior to making the switch or running a hybrid period.
2004 Performance (4-12): 24.4 PPG (24th), 4.3 YPC (18th), 6.7 YPP (9th), 79.0 PRA (16th), 36% 3D (15th), 32 sk (27th), 15 int (19th), 109 pen (12th)
2005 Performance (6-10): 18.8 PPG (11th), 4.2 YPC (22nd), 6.7 YPP (7th), 78.2 PRA (16th), 40% 3D (20th), 23 sk (32nd), 15 in (19th), 97 pen (3rd)
Romeo's defense didn't follow the typical Fairbanks 3-4 transition, the 3rd down performance declined and the penalties declined. In fact very little improved aside from the defense's ability to prevent scoring. But that most important aspect did improve, again following the trend of improvement shown by teams switching to a 3-4 or hybrid.
Baltimore Ravens:
The Ravens have been a hybrid defense for some time, switching back and forth between the defenses almost at will for many years. The start of that defensive style began when coordinator Marvin Lewis was hired to coach the Bengals and Mike Nolan took over as defensive coordinator, prior to the 2002 season. The Ravens are a little different case, there was a large exodus of retirements and players leaving after the 2001 season, the switch was based as much on necessity (an excess of linebackers and lack of bodies on the DL) as it was a purposeful change to go in a new direction.
2001 Performance (10-6): 16.6 PPG (4th), 3.4 YPC (2nd), 6.0 YPP (1st), 72.8 PRA (12th), 31% 3D (3rd), 45 sk (7th), 16 int (17th), 105 pen (30th)
2002 Performance (7-9): 22.1 PPG (19th), 3.7 YPC (1st), 6.7 YPP (16th), 73.4 PRA (5th), 40% 3D (21st), 33 sk (22nd), 25 int (2nd), 104 pen (20th)
The Ravens are an interesting case, simply because the initial motivation was a little different than most. Following the 2001 season they lost several players, notably Tony Siragusa; Mike Nolan took the defense in a different direction and fielded what worked well for his personnel. Also notable is they are the only elite squad to switch away from a pure 4-3. They did struggle a good deal preventing scoring (relative to the previous season), the main problems stemmed from a decrease in pressure and poor 3rd down performance. However the run defense did not significantly decline, nor did the pass defense, and penalties were largely unchanged.
Arizona Cardinals:
When Ken Wisenhunt was hired to coach the Cardinals in 2007, one of his goals was to move the team away from the pure 4-3 defense they had been running, eventually reaching a 3-4 defense. They have largely been using the Miami model, taking their time running a hybrid scheme and acquiring personnel prior to fully transitioning to a 3-4 scheme, which has not yet occurred.
2006 Performance (5-11): 24.3 PPG (29th), 4.1 YPC (14th), 7.5 YPP (31st), 85.4 PRA (24th), 41% 3D (21st), 38 sk (12th), 16 int (17th), 95 pen (17th)
2007 Performance (8-8): 24.9 PPG (27th), 3.9 YPC (10th), 6.9 YPP (14th), 85.8 PRA (22nd), 40% 3D (17th), 36 sk (13th), 18 int (10th), 118 pen (30th)
The Cardinals are almost the exact opposite of the Browns. When looking at the Browns individual stats for the parts of the defense, there was little to suggest large improvements in the scoring defense; the Cardinals however did improve slightly in a number of categories without any improvement to the bottom line.
Some now defunct attempts at a switch to a 3-4:
Minnesota Vikings:
In the final year of the Mike Tice era, Minnesota flirted with the idea of running a 3-4 defense, though they never really committed to it 100%. The biggest positive still remaining from the attempt is NT Pat Williams, who was brought in via FA to hold down the nose. When Brad Childress was hired, that idea was all but abandoned. But, they did occasionally use a 3-4 alignment in 2005.
2004 Performance (8-8): 24.7 PPG (26th), 4.6 YPC (26th), 7.6 YPP (27th), 95.5 PRA (28th), 46% 3D (30th), 39 sk (12th), 11 int (28th), 110 pen (15th)
2005 Performance (9-7): 21.5 PPG (19th), 4.0 YPC (15th), 6.6 YPP (10th), 75.2 PRA (10th), 43% 3D (31st), 34 sk (22nd), 24 int (2nd), 137 pen (30th)
The pressure went down a bit, and the flags were flying, but overall there was improvement across the board, with a drastic increase in the number of interceptions (no doubt TT letting Sharper go played a big role). 1 or 2 more wins that season and a playoff appearance, there is a decent chance Tice wouldn't have been fired and that the 3-4 would have stuck in Mn, at least for a little bit.
Atlanta Falcons:
The Falcons had a short lived flirtation with a 3-4 defense in the earlier part of this decade while Wade was defensive coordinator, prior to his transition of the Chargers defense. Unlike the Vikings, Atlanta fully committed to a switch and ran a 3-4 for 2 years, prior to the hiring of Jim Mora and his subsequent transition back to a 4-3. Notable is that it was the Falcons first year running a 3-4 defense under Phillips that handed Green Bay their first ever playoff loss at Lambeau Field.
2001 Performance (7-9): 23.6 PPG (24th), 4.8 YPC (30th), 8.0 YPP (30th), 93.3 PRA (30th), 46% 3D (31st), 37 sk (19th), 18 int (13th), 97 pen (20th)
2002 Performance (9-6-1): 19.6 PPG (8th), 4.6 YPC (27th), 7.0 YPP (25th), 72.8 PRA (4th), 40% 3D (20th), 47 sk (4th), 24 int (3rd), 112 pen (25th)
The 2002 Falcons were playmakers, sacks and ints galore. The fundamental defense, run, pass, and 3rd down, all improved, however the flags flew. The improvement towards the bottom line, preventing scoring, was dramatic.
Jacksonville Jaguars:
Jacksonville was one of two new expansion teams in the mid 1990's. Both teams found almost immediate success, being playoff powerhouses by their second year. After many of the initial wave of players moved on due to roster turnover, Jacksonville saw a decline in the performance of their defense in the late 1990's, Dom Capers was brought in to revive the unit by Tom Coughlin. He immediately set about to transform the defense to his preferred 3-4 base from the 4-3 that they had been running under Jaron. This is perhaps the most relevant case study as it relates to the Packers 0f 2009. In Miami the team had already begun transforming into a hybrid prior to his arrival, and Head Coach Nick Saban was a defensive minded coach that surely had a hand in the defense along with Dom, Saban also being a 3-4 proponent. Coughlin on the other hand ceded near complete control of the defense to Dom. This team also dedicated heavy draft resources to the defense, spending all but 2 picks on on the defense. They also added a defensive end and safety via free agency. Notable is that there was no prototypical giant NT on the roster, nor was one acquired, they used a rotation of starter Seth Payne (6'4", 300 lb) and rookie Larry Smith (6'5", 295 lb).
1998 Performance (11-5): 21.1 PPG (17th), 4.4 YPC (26th), 6.5 YPP (8th), 80.1 PRA (19th), 36% 3D (11th), 30 sk (27th), 13 int (21st), 109 pen (13th)
1999 Performance (14-2): 13.6 PPG (1st), 3.9 YPC (13th), 6.3 YPP (4th), 71.0 PRA (11th), 34% 3D (9th), 57 sk (1st), 19 int (12th), 93 pen (8th)
Another instance of dramatic improvement. Dom turned a slightly below average unit into an elite unit overnight. The only primary indicator where the team was elite was in pass defense, which improved, but the team saw a dramatic improvement in pressure, with almost every starting defender notching at least 1, both OLB's and a DE managed more than 10. Just like in Miami, the squad had a better pass defense than run defense, though the run defense moderately improved, the pressure went way up and the penalties went down, and just like Miami the 3rd down performance was not commensurate with the overall quality of the defense, lagging behind the scoring performance.
....these are all the pure 4-3 to 3-4 or hybrid transformations that I am aware of in the last 10 years. If anybody is aware of any more, let me know and I'll post the results.
There is only 1 example that I am aware of where where a previously hybrid team finished the deal and became a full blown 3-4, however the San Francisco 49ers will probably be added to that category this season.
Miami Dolphins:
It seems that Miami lost their way after Saban's departure. Saban initially set out to transform into a 3-4 over time, however the defense found success as a hybrid and never really finished the transformation until Bill Parcells was brought in to complete what was begun 3 years prior.
2007 Performance (1-15): 27.3 PPG (30th), 4.5 YPC (29th), 7.8 YPP (31st), 92.4 PRA (29th), 47% 3D (32nd), 30 sk (24th), 14 int (23rd), 73 pen (1st)
2008 Performance (11-5): 19.8 PPG (9th), 4.2 YPC (16th), 7.0 YPP (17th), 77.0 PRA (9th), 38% 3D (10th), 40 sk (8th), 18 int (8th), 86 pen (14th)
Bill drafted and brought in via FA a number of players for the defense, including NT Jason Ferguson. The defense dramatically improved across the board, in all areas but penalties, sticking with a typical Parcells tree switch. The run defense improved a little. The biggest gains were on 3rd down performance (another Parcells hallmark) and in pass defense.
_________________
some truths
1- This defence has several talented players, we just dont use them correctly.
2- No Hybrid 3-4 was ever as succsesful as a team that went full on 3-4 HOWEVER, No team ever made the switch as poorly timed as the Redskins.
3-despite what some stupid people may have told you, the 3-4 requires a completely skillset from almost every player in the front 7. and contrary to popular belief, its not all physical.
4- being big strong and fast doesnt guarentee successful switching.
I found this post by a Packers fan who was looking for stuff about the change to a 3-4 when his team was doing it last year, there are some very interesting facts in his post.
Credited to Waldo
"So.....an unbiased review of all the teams that I could come up with that have switched from pure 4-3 to either a hybrid or 3-4 base in the last 10 years. I compare their season prior to the switch to the season they made the switch, in an effort to study many of the truths, half truths, and myths about converting from one defense or the other. The raw data used is the performance stats of the defense. The first post goes team by team to examine each situation and look at the stats. The second post is a roll up analysis comparing all situations to each other, looking at the change, positive or negative, from one year to another. My thinking has been greatly altered by undertaking this exercise, I learned many things that I did not expect to discover.
Raw Data and Commentary of the individual situations:
There were 10 teams running 3-4 or hybrid defenses in the 2008 season. How they changed:
(Pittsburgh is excluded as they have been running the defense for decades, making data difficult to find, and it was done prior to the current era of free agency):
Abbreviations used: PPG = Points per game (scoring defense), YPC = Yards per carry (run defense), YPP = Yards per pass (pass defense), PRA = Passer rating against (Pass defense), 3D = 3rd down % (sub package defense), Sk = Sacks, Int = Interceptions, Pen = Penalties
(fumbles were ignored due to random nature of recoveries)
San Fransisco 49ers:
The 49ers began the change to a 3-4 defense in 2005 when Mike Nolan took over, primarily a 2 gap 3-4 base. The defense never really took and yearly the team would waiver between a 3-4, 4-3, and Big Nickel as the base defense, until Singletary took over full time in 2008 and fully committed to a 1 gap 3-4 front.
2004 performance (2-14): 28.2 PPG (32nd), 4.0 YPC (12th), 7.5 YPP (25th), 96.5 PRA (29th), 40% 3D (23rd), 29 sk (29th), 9 int (29th), 107 pen (10th)
2005 performance (4-12): 26.8 PPG (29th), 3.8 YPC (11th), 8.0 YPP (32nd), 94.2 PRA (29th), 38% 3D (18th), 28 sk (28th), 16 int (14th), 120 pen (20th)
San Francisco's defense showed slight improvement overall despite a very poor offensive showing. The biggest improvement came in turnovers, where the defense noticeably improved. There were slight improvements to the overall scoring defense, run defense, and 3rd down defense, however the defense yielded a lot of big plays and was penalized more. There was no improvement to the pressure applied by the defense.
San Diego Chargers:
Martyball came to San Diego in 2002. After two dreadful years running a 4-3 defense, he fired his DC and hired the head honcho of the 1 gap 3-4 in the NFL, Wade Phillips, to transition the defense to a 3-4. Unlike the situation in San Francisco, the team already had a young NT entering his prime that toiled in obscurity in the 4-3 alignment, and heavy draft resources were dedicated to the effort.
2003 Performance (4-12): 26.7 PPG (31st), 4.3 YPC (20th), 6.8 YPP (18th), 94.3 PRA (32nd), 42% 3D (29th), 30 sk (24th), 13 int (23rd), 110 pen (21st)
2004 Performance (12-4): 19.6 PPG (11th), 3.7 YPC (6th), 6.9 YPP (14th), 76.6 PRA (9th), 35% 3D (10th), 29 sk (29th), 23 int (3rd), 109 pen (12th)
The returns from the switch in San Diego was immediate drastic improvement, improving from one of the leagues worst squads to a solidly above average squad. The most notable areas of improvement were huge improvements to the run defense, interceptions, and 3rd down efficiency. The one area that notably did not improve was the defenses ability to apply pressure, however their star pass rusher was not added until the following season.
Dallas Cowboys:
The Big Tuna was brought to Dallas in 2003 by Jerry Jones to turn the sinking franchise around. Unlike the previous two examples, Parcells slow played the transition and didn't make the switch until he had acquired many of the pieces. The year the switch was made (2005), heavy resources were dedicated to the effort, including a FA NT, 2 DE's via the draft and 2 OLB's via the draft. Bill Parcells is the standard bearer in the NFL of the old style Fairbanks 2 gap 3-4 prevalent in the NFL in the 1980's.
2004 Performance (6-10): 25.3 PPG (27th), 4.2 YPC (17th), 7.4 YPP (23rd), 94.2 PRA (27th), 39% 3D (22nd), 33 sk (26th), 13 int (24th), 104 pen (7th)
2005 Performance (9-7): 19.2 PPG (12th), 4.2 YPC (22nd), 6.7 YPP (13th), 75.1 PRA (9th), 35% 3d (6th), 37 sk (14th), 15 int (19th), 142 pen (32nd)
The Cowboys defense overall saw marked improvement after making the switch, moving from an overall poor unit to an above average unit the first year. Unlike SD and SF, the biggest gains were to the pass defense, where the unit improved across the board, with a very good showing on 3rd downs. The run defense changed little in the first year. The squad did see an increase in pressure, somewhat bucking the trend. One thing that stands out is that the unit was heavily penalized in the first year.
Miami Dolphins:
I'm actually going to consider a 3 year period for the Dolphins, due in part to the relevance to the Packers of today. Prior to 2005, the Dolphins had been running a Jim Bates 4-3, which he brought to Green Bay and installed after the hiring of Nick Saban. When Saban was hired, he began to transition the defense towards a 3-4 defense, and for a few years the team ran a complex 4-3/3-4 hybrid, at first primarily coached by Saban, but after the firing of Dom Capers from Houston he was brought on board to coordinate the defense full time in 2006.
2004 Performance (9-7): 22.1 PPG (20th), 4.3 YPC (18th), 6.5 YPP (5th), 76.9 PRA (10th), 32% 3D (5th), 36 sk (21st), 15 int (19th), 107 pen (10th)
2005 Performance (9-7): 19.8 PPG (15th), 3.7 YPC (7th), 6.7 YPP (13th), 82.4 PRA (22nd), 40% 3D (23rd), 49 sk (2nd), 14 int (23rd), 105 pen (7th)
2006 Performance (6-10): 17.7 PPG (5th), 3.5 YPC (3rd), 6.6 YPP (9th), 84.4 PRA (21st), 38% 3D (17th), 47 sk (3rd), 8 int (31st), 91 pen (13th)
Over the course of the hybrid period, the defense improved from a below average unit to an elite unit over the course of two seasons, being an average unit in the first hybrid year. During this period the run defense continually improved, whereas the pass defense slightly declined. Notable, the 3rd down performance drastically declined after Bates' departure, and the interception totals slumped, however the pressure drastically improved. There were no effects on the penalties called against the team.
New York Jets:
The New York Jets is one example of a 4-3 to 3-4 switch done while doing little to alter the personnel immediately, especially odd considering the previous defense, a 4-3 Tampa-2 incarnation led by Herm Edwards, had personnel fairly poorly suited to running a 3-4. But that didn't stop Eric Mangini from making the change, opting to quickly make the switch in lieu of slow playing it or a hybrid period. Mangini's version is straight from the Parcells/Bellicheck tree and is a modern incarnation of an old style Fairbanks 2 gap 3-4.
2005 Performance (4-12): 22.2 PPG (23rd), 3.9 YPC (12th), 6.5 YPP (7th), 73.1 PRA (6th), 42% 3D (28th), 30 sk (25th), 21 int (5th), 115 pen (16th)
2006 Performance (10-6): 18.4 PPG (6th), 4.6 YPC (26th), 6.5 YPP (6th), 78.0 PRA (12th), 36% 3D (10th), 35 sk (15th), 16 int (17th), 105 pen (29th)
Though the defense struggled with run defense in the first year, slumping from an above average unit to a bottom dweller, overall the defense improved from a well below average unit to a borderline elite unit in the first season. The really notable area of improvement is the 3rd down performance of the squad, which drastically improved. The pass defense declined a little, especially in the turnovers, but he was able to create more pressure in the first year in the defense. The defense however was highly penalized, slumping from an average unit to a bottom dweller. There are similarities in how this switch went and how the switch went in Dallas, notable due to the similarities of the scheme (fairly dissimilar from Dom's concepts).
New England Patriots:
Bill Belichick was hired in 2000 to return the Pats to glory. He followed the Parcells model to transition to the 3-4, acquiring the pieces over a few years (and playing the occasional 3-4 look) before fully making the switch in 2003 (though they waiver between 3-4 looks and 4-3 looks even today). The year of the switch they dedicated draft resources to the change, and acquired several pieces in FA, including experienced NT Ted Washington. Notably they won the super bowl the year they made the switch.
2002 Performance (9-7): 21.6 PPG (17th), 4.7 YPC (29th), 6.4 YPP (8th), 78.2 PRA (15th), 43% 3D (26th), 34 sk (20th), 18 int (12th), 99 pen (7th)
2003 Performance (14-2*): 14.9 PPG (1st), 3.6 YPC (6th), 5.6 YPP (1st), 56.2 PRA (1st), 34% 3D (7th), 41 sk (6th), 29 int (1st), 107 pen (19th)
This was another soft change, time was taken to build the pieces, and the team had occasionally run 3-4 concepts even predating Bill, but they changed to a 3-4 base in 2003 in a dramatic fashion. The unit shot from average to elite overnight, placing first in many categories. It has the hallmarks of the Fairbanks 2 gap 3-4 switch however, drastic improvement in 3rd down performance, increased pressure, and an increase in flags. However unlike Mangini and Parcells, Belichick's change was accompanied by drastic run defense improvement, which propelled the unit to the very top and won a Lombardi trophy.
Cleveland Browns:
When Romeo Crennel was hired in Cleveland off of New England's staff, the first thing he set out to do was sweep away Butch Davis' 4-3 defense and install his own brand of a Fairbanks 2 gap 3-4. Again like Mangini in NY, little effort was paid to actually acquire new players prior to making the switch or running a hybrid period.
2004 Performance (4-12): 24.4 PPG (24th), 4.3 YPC (18th), 6.7 YPP (9th), 79.0 PRA (16th), 36% 3D (15th), 32 sk (27th), 15 int (19th), 109 pen (12th)
2005 Performance (6-10): 18.8 PPG (11th), 4.2 YPC (22nd), 6.7 YPP (7th), 78.2 PRA (16th), 40% 3D (20th), 23 sk (32nd), 15 in (19th), 97 pen (3rd)
Romeo's defense didn't follow the typical Fairbanks 3-4 transition, the 3rd down performance declined and the penalties declined. In fact very little improved aside from the defense's ability to prevent scoring. But that most important aspect did improve, again following the trend of improvement shown by teams switching to a 3-4 or hybrid.
Baltimore Ravens:
The Ravens have been a hybrid defense for some time, switching back and forth between the defenses almost at will for many years. The start of that defensive style began when coordinator Marvin Lewis was hired to coach the Bengals and Mike Nolan took over as defensive coordinator, prior to the 2002 season. The Ravens are a little different case, there was a large exodus of retirements and players leaving after the 2001 season, the switch was based as much on necessity (an excess of linebackers and lack of bodies on the DL) as it was a purposeful change to go in a new direction.
2001 Performance (10-6): 16.6 PPG (4th), 3.4 YPC (2nd), 6.0 YPP (1st), 72.8 PRA (12th), 31% 3D (3rd), 45 sk (7th), 16 int (17th), 105 pen (30th)
2002 Performance (7-9): 22.1 PPG (19th), 3.7 YPC (1st), 6.7 YPP (16th), 73.4 PRA (5th), 40% 3D (21st), 33 sk (22nd), 25 int (2nd), 104 pen (20th)
The Ravens are an interesting case, simply because the initial motivation was a little different than most. Following the 2001 season they lost several players, notably Tony Siragusa; Mike Nolan took the defense in a different direction and fielded what worked well for his personnel. Also notable is they are the only elite squad to switch away from a pure 4-3. They did struggle a good deal preventing scoring (relative to the previous season), the main problems stemmed from a decrease in pressure and poor 3rd down performance. However the run defense did not significantly decline, nor did the pass defense, and penalties were largely unchanged.
Arizona Cardinals:
When Ken Wisenhunt was hired to coach the Cardinals in 2007, one of his goals was to move the team away from the pure 4-3 defense they had been running, eventually reaching a 3-4 defense. They have largely been using the Miami model, taking their time running a hybrid scheme and acquiring personnel prior to fully transitioning to a 3-4 scheme, which has not yet occurred.
2006 Performance (5-11): 24.3 PPG (29th), 4.1 YPC (14th), 7.5 YPP (31st), 85.4 PRA (24th), 41% 3D (21st), 38 sk (12th), 16 int (17th), 95 pen (17th)
2007 Performance (8-8): 24.9 PPG (27th), 3.9 YPC (10th), 6.9 YPP (14th), 85.8 PRA (22nd), 40% 3D (17th), 36 sk (13th), 18 int (10th), 118 pen (30th)
The Cardinals are almost the exact opposite of the Browns. When looking at the Browns individual stats for the parts of the defense, there was little to suggest large improvements in the scoring defense; the Cardinals however did improve slightly in a number of categories without any improvement to the bottom line.
Some now defunct attempts at a switch to a 3-4:
Minnesota Vikings:
In the final year of the Mike Tice era, Minnesota flirted with the idea of running a 3-4 defense, though they never really committed to it 100%. The biggest positive still remaining from the attempt is NT Pat Williams, who was brought in via FA to hold down the nose. When Brad Childress was hired, that idea was all but abandoned. But, they did occasionally use a 3-4 alignment in 2005.
2004 Performance (8-8): 24.7 PPG (26th), 4.6 YPC (26th), 7.6 YPP (27th), 95.5 PRA (28th), 46% 3D (30th), 39 sk (12th), 11 int (28th), 110 pen (15th)
2005 Performance (9-7): 21.5 PPG (19th), 4.0 YPC (15th), 6.6 YPP (10th), 75.2 PRA (10th), 43% 3D (31st), 34 sk (22nd), 24 int (2nd), 137 pen (30th)
The pressure went down a bit, and the flags were flying, but overall there was improvement across the board, with a drastic increase in the number of interceptions (no doubt TT letting Sharper go played a big role). 1 or 2 more wins that season and a playoff appearance, there is a decent chance Tice wouldn't have been fired and that the 3-4 would have stuck in Mn, at least for a little bit.
Atlanta Falcons:
The Falcons had a short lived flirtation with a 3-4 defense in the earlier part of this decade while Wade was defensive coordinator, prior to his transition of the Chargers defense. Unlike the Vikings, Atlanta fully committed to a switch and ran a 3-4 for 2 years, prior to the hiring of Jim Mora and his subsequent transition back to a 4-3. Notable is that it was the Falcons first year running a 3-4 defense under Phillips that handed Green Bay their first ever playoff loss at Lambeau Field.
2001 Performance (7-9): 23.6 PPG (24th), 4.8 YPC (30th), 8.0 YPP (30th), 93.3 PRA (30th), 46% 3D (31st), 37 sk (19th), 18 int (13th), 97 pen (20th)
2002 Performance (9-6-1): 19.6 PPG (8th), 4.6 YPC (27th), 7.0 YPP (25th), 72.8 PRA (4th), 40% 3D (20th), 47 sk (4th), 24 int (3rd), 112 pen (25th)
The 2002 Falcons were playmakers, sacks and ints galore. The fundamental defense, run, pass, and 3rd down, all improved, however the flags flew. The improvement towards the bottom line, preventing scoring, was dramatic.
Jacksonville Jaguars:
Jacksonville was one of two new expansion teams in the mid 1990's. Both teams found almost immediate success, being playoff powerhouses by their second year. After many of the initial wave of players moved on due to roster turnover, Jacksonville saw a decline in the performance of their defense in the late 1990's, Dom Capers was brought in to revive the unit by Tom Coughlin. He immediately set about to transform the defense to his preferred 3-4 base from the 4-3 that they had been running under Jaron. This is perhaps the most relevant case study as it relates to the Packers 0f 2009. In Miami the team had already begun transforming into a hybrid prior to his arrival, and Head Coach Nick Saban was a defensive minded coach that surely had a hand in the defense along with Dom, Saban also being a 3-4 proponent. Coughlin on the other hand ceded near complete control of the defense to Dom. This team also dedicated heavy draft resources to the defense, spending all but 2 picks on on the defense. They also added a defensive end and safety via free agency. Notable is that there was no prototypical giant NT on the roster, nor was one acquired, they used a rotation of starter Seth Payne (6'4", 300 lb) and rookie Larry Smith (6'5", 295 lb).
1998 Performance (11-5): 21.1 PPG (17th), 4.4 YPC (26th), 6.5 YPP (8th), 80.1 PRA (19th), 36% 3D (11th), 30 sk (27th), 13 int (21st), 109 pen (13th)
1999 Performance (14-2): 13.6 PPG (1st), 3.9 YPC (13th), 6.3 YPP (4th), 71.0 PRA (11th), 34% 3D (9th), 57 sk (1st), 19 int (12th), 93 pen (8th)
Another instance of dramatic improvement. Dom turned a slightly below average unit into an elite unit overnight. The only primary indicator where the team was elite was in pass defense, which improved, but the team saw a dramatic improvement in pressure, with almost every starting defender notching at least 1, both OLB's and a DE managed more than 10. Just like in Miami, the squad had a better pass defense than run defense, though the run defense moderately improved, the pressure went way up and the penalties went down, and just like Miami the 3rd down performance was not commensurate with the overall quality of the defense, lagging behind the scoring performance.
....these are all the pure 4-3 to 3-4 or hybrid transformations that I am aware of in the last 10 years. If anybody is aware of any more, let me know and I'll post the results.
There is only 1 example that I am aware of where where a previously hybrid team finished the deal and became a full blown 3-4, however the San Francisco 49ers will probably be added to that category this season.
Miami Dolphins:
It seems that Miami lost their way after Saban's departure. Saban initially set out to transform into a 3-4 over time, however the defense found success as a hybrid and never really finished the transformation until Bill Parcells was brought in to complete what was begun 3 years prior.
2007 Performance (1-15): 27.3 PPG (30th), 4.5 YPC (29th), 7.8 YPP (31st), 92.4 PRA (29th), 47% 3D (32nd), 30 sk (24th), 14 int (23rd), 73 pen (1st)
2008 Performance (11-5): 19.8 PPG (9th), 4.2 YPC (16th), 7.0 YPP (17th), 77.0 PRA (9th), 38% 3D (10th), 40 sk (8th), 18 int (8th), 86 pen (14th)
Bill drafted and brought in via FA a number of players for the defense, including NT Jason Ferguson. The defense dramatically improved across the board, in all areas but penalties, sticking with a typical Parcells tree switch. The run defense improved a little. The biggest gains were on 3rd down performance (another Parcells hallmark) and in pass defense.
_________________